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4th Portuguese India Armada (Gama, 1502)
The Fourth India Armada was assembled in 1502 on the order of King Manuel I of Portugal and placed under the command of D. Vasco da Gama. It was Gama's second trip to India. It was designed as a punitive expedition, targeting Calicut, to avenge the travails of the 2nd Armada and the massacre of the Portuguese factory in 1500. Along the way, in East Africa, the 4th Armada established a Portuguese factory in Mozambique, made contact and opened trade with the gold entrepot of Sofala and exorted tribute from Kilwa. Once in India, the armada set about attacking Calicut shipping and disrupting trade along much of the Malabar Coast. But the ruling Zamorin of Calicut refused to accede to Portuguese demands, arguing that the violent exactions of the armada exceeded any claims they might have for compensation. The 4th Armada left without bringing the Zamorin to terms and leaving matters unresolved. Before departing, the armada established a crown factory in Cannanore and left behind a small patrol under Vicente Sodré, the first permanent Portuguese fleet in the Indian Ocean. Appointment of Gama The Second India Armada, commanded by Pedro Álvares Cabral, had arrived in Portugal in the summer of 1501 in a terrible shape. Ship and human losses were tremendous, its mission objectives failed. They had failed to establish a factory in Sofala, the outlet of the Monomatapa gold trade in East Africa, and, more worrisomely, opened hostilities with the city-state of Calicut (Calecute, Kozhikode), the principal commercial entrepôt of the Kerala spice trade and dominant city-state on the Malabar coast of India. By the time this news was received, the 3rd India Armada under João da Nova had already departed, a commercial expedition unequipped to deal with the hostile turn of events in the Indian Ocean. As a result, King Manuel I of Portugal ordered a new fleet to be assembled, the 4th India Armada, armed to the teeth, with the explicit objective of bringing Calicut to heel.Chroniclers are generally unanimous about the avenging nature of the expedition, e.g. Castanheda, p.130 ]] The command of the 4th Armada was offered to Pedro Álvares Cabral. But various factions in the Portuguese court and the Casa da India, opposed Cabral's appointment, on the grounds that it was Cabral's 'incompetence' that had created this unhappy situation to begin with. However, Cabral had his own political supporters Subrahmanyam (1997: p.177) notes that Cabral was a knight of Manuel's Order of Christ, while Vasco da Gama was a knight of the Order of Santiago. It is tempting to cast the Gama-Cabral quarrel to be one between the rival orders, i.e. that Cabral was the 'candidate' of Order of Christ, Gama of Santiago. That may have a kernel of truth as far as explaining Cabral's appointment to the 2nd Armada. But for the 4th Armada, the principal opposition to Cabral's new appointment actually came from Gama's uncle, Vicente Sodré, a leading figure of the Order of Christ, alcaide of their spiritual home, the citadel of Tomar. that could not be ignored. The king tried to compromise by offering Cabral the position of captain-major (capitão-mor), but letting it be clearly understood that his command of the fleet would not be absolute, that at least one squadron would be placed under the separate command of Vicente Sodré (an uncle of Vasco da Gama, and leading opponent of Cabral). Finding this condition an unacceptable affront, Cabral withdrew his name in a huff.Subrahmanyam (1997: p.191). Manuel I immediately appointed Vasco da Gama himself as captain-major. The intrigues behind the appointment have been variously told. By some accounts, the initial offer to Cabral was a pro forma gesture to palliate his faction rather than an earnest offer. In other words, the king never had any intention of letting Cabral lead the expedition, that the onerous conditions were introduced knowing Cabral would find them unacceptable.Barros (p.22): "como elle era homem de muitos primores ácerca de pontos de honra" 'because he was a man very particular about points of honor'. That these conditions were only revealed at the last minute, just before the fleet's departure, lends credence to the theory, i.e. the monarch did not want to give Cabral time to reconsider or allow opposition to mount against Gama's rapid appointment. Chronicler Gaspar Correia tells a slightly different story - he does not mention Sodré's command, but rather relates how King Manuel I summoned Vasco da Gama a mere three days before the scheduled departure date and expressed his "disappointment and mistrust" of Cabral's "dubious fortune" at sea.,"El Rey tinha desgosto e disconfianca da duvidosa fortuna de Pedralvarez Cabral" (Correia, p.267) Interjecting, the queen 'helpfully' pointed out that such ill-fortune did not seem to afflict Vasco da Gama. but that he had made a promise to Cabral and could not break it. On this hint, Gama produced a royal letter (issued by Manuel back in 1500, and reiterated in October 1501), promising Gama a determining role in any future India expedition, and demanded command of the expedition for himself.According to Correia (p.267-8), Gama felt the destruction of the Calicut factory was ultimately his fault, because, on his first expedition in 1497-99, he had allowed the Zamorin's offenses to go unpunished, which only encouraged him to do even greater injury to Cabral. Thus, the punishment of the Zamorin should be his (Gama's) responsibility. The king was caught between two commitments - honoring the letter to Gama, or his appointment to Cabral. Hearing of the king's quandary, Cabral voluntarily withdrew his name to graciously allow Manuel I to honor his letter.Correia (p.268); Subrahmanyam (1997: p.191) The 16th-century chroniclers seem to agree that King Manuel I wanted to deprive Cabral of command, and that the Sodré appointment and/or the Gama letter was just a ploy by the king to wiggle out of appointing Cabral.Correia is clear that Manuel I hoped Gama would invoke the letter, "ElRey dissimulou o muyto prazer do seu coracao" (Correia, p.267). Castanheda (p.130) states only that Cabral was deprived of command "por algũs justos respeitos" ('for some just reasons'). But some later authors have interpreted the accounts differently, that King Manuel I was wholly behind Cabral, but was forced to yield to the unsavory machinations of the Gama-Sodré family.e.g. Sanches de Baena (1897: p.46ff) Just before his departure, in a solemn ceremony at the Lisbon Cathedral on January 30, 1502, King Manuel I bestowed upon Vasco da Gama the newly created title of Almirante dos mares de Arabia, Persia, India e de todo o Oriente ("Admiral of the Seas of Arabia, Persia, India and all the Orient") - an overwrought title reminiscent of the ornate Castilian title borne by Christopher Columbus. (Evidently, Manuel must have reckoned that if Castile had an 'Admiral of the Seas' running around, then surely Portugal should have one too.) Barros, p.24 On a side note, this was the first India armada for which the vintena de Belém was introduced - that is, the 5% tax on profits of private trading by captains and officers of Portuguese India Armadas, earmarked for the construction and maintenance of the Jerónimos Monastery in the Belém district of Lisbon.Correia, p.270 The vintena would continue until 1522. The Fleet The 4th Armada was composed of 20 ships and between 800 and 1800 men.Barros (p.268) says 1800 soldiers; Gaspar Correia (p.269) says 800 men-at-arms. The Armada was originally envisaged as two squadrons - 15 ships under the admiral to head to India, 5 under the vice-admiral designated to patrol the mouth of the Red Sea. As it turns out, not all ships were ready by the launch date, so the armada was re-arranged into three squadrons, the first two squadrons (10 under admiral Vasco da Gama, 5 under his uncle, vice-admiral Vicente Sodré) to head out at once, and the five remaining ships to go out a little while later as a third squadron under Gama's cousin, Estêvão da Gama, with instructions to catch up to the main fleet along the way. (Whatever the mechanics behind the appointment, the 4th Armada certainly turned out to be a Gama family affair!) The exact composition of the three squadrons differs in the various accounts. The following list of ships should not be regarded as authoritative, but a tentative list compiled from various conflicting accounts. list of captains is principally based on [[João de Barros]'s Décadas,Barros, Dec. I, Bk VI, c.2, p.21ff. Barros's list is as above. For the second squad, he assigns ships to Vicente Sodré and Braz Sodré (making no mention of d'Atougoia or Pêro Rafael). He names d'Ataíde as 'Álvaro' rather than 'Pêro'. Barros avers that Antonio Fernandes might have only been given a ship only in Mozambique. Barros doesn't list ship names, but later in the narrative (e.g. p.38) refers to some of them, e.g. confirms São Jeronimo for Gama, Lionarda for Coutinho, Juiloa for Lopo Mendes de Vasconcellos and identifies Gil Matoso's ship as the São Gabriel (p.38, rather than Miguel) and Pedro Afonso de Aguiar's ship in India (the Leitoa according to Correia) as São Pantaleão (p.42) Damião de Gois's Chronica,Gois, p.88 Gois's captains list is as above, with the following modifications: in the first squad, Gil Fernandes is referred to as 'Luis Fernandes'; Diogo Fernandes Correa is omitted, replaced by a certain 'Luis Pires'. In the second squad, he adds Pêro Rafael and drops Antonio Fernandes. Castanheda's História,Castanheda, p.130 Castanheda's captains list is as above, with the following variations: in the first squad, Pêro de Ataíde is shifted from the second to the first squad (Gil Fernandes is omitted). This opens up a slot to include Pêro Rafael in the second squadron. Castanheda adds a sixth name to the second squadron - a certain "Diogo Pires" (a man of that name is mentioned later commanding a caravel during the Battle of Cochin (1504)). Castanheda fits the six captains into five ships by noting that António Fernandes was given a ship only after arrival in India. He does not name the captains of the third squad. the Relação das Náos,Relação (p.13). The main Relação list makes note of Coutinho's nickname ('Ramiro') and Gil Fernandes's surname ('de Sousa'). It refers to Álvaro d'Ataide (not Pêro) and to Thomaz de 'Cremona' (rather than Carmona). It makes no mention of Pêro Rafael. Also gives ship composition, noting there were five caravels (Bardaças, A. Fernandes, Cremona, Dias and Bonagracia), the remainder naus. A side gloss reproduces the list originally given by Barros (see above). Couto's list,Couto, "De todas as armadas, &c.", in Barros & Couto, Decadas da Asia, Dec. X, Pt.1, Bk.1, c.16, p.118-9. Couto's list is as in Barros, with a couple of apparent transcription errors - d'Ataíde is mistakenly given as Álvaro Sodré, and Lopo Mendes is given as Lopo Martins de Vasconcellos. The Italian Bonagracia referred to as 'Buena Gracia'. Faria e Sousa's Asia''Faria e Sousa, 1666, p.52. Faria e Sousa follows Barros's list exactly. and Quintella's ''Annaes da Marinha.Quintella, 1839: p.267-8 The list of ship names is from Gaspar Correia's Lendas da Índia.Correia, p.266f.. Also as translated in Stanley, 1869 p.281. and should be suspected as unreliable. Drawing from Lisbon archival documents originally published by Brito Rebello (1898), Subrahmanyam (1997: p.192) gives different names to some of the ships. He notes that the four ships designated to remain in India on patrol were the São Paulo (caravel of Pêro de Ataíde?), Santa Marta (caravel of Fernão Rodrigues Bardaças?) and two new names, the São Pedro and Esmeralda, with the note that the latter was Vicente Sodré's patrol ship (Correia (p.291) seems to insinuate that the Leitoa and Esmeralda are one and the same ship). There are an additional seven ships named in the archives, with the only clear assignments being that Francisco da Cunha was the captain of the Leitoa (rather than Bretoa), Rui de Castanheda is assigned to the São Pantaleão de Batecabello (rather than Vera Cruz) and Pedro Afonso de Aguiar is assigned the São Pantaleão do Porto (rather than Santa Elena). Subrahmanyam confirms São Jerónimo as Vasco da Gama's ship and the Lionarda as Luis Coutinho's ship. As we do not have access to Brito Rebelo's article or documents, we will maintain the original assignment of ship names as given in Gaspar Correia, although it is almost certainly incorrect. On a side note, eyewitness accounts of Thomé Lopes and Matteo da Bergamo introduce more ship names not on the list - the Esmeralda (which Lopes, p.189, identifies as one of the three largest in the fleet, p.189), the São Gabriel (possibly Gil Matoso's?) and the Santo António of 'Ruy de Figueiredo' (Castanheda? Or a ship's owner's name?). Doubtlessly Correia's list uses some nicknames, rather than official names, of several of the ships. As usual, Correia's list of captains differs significantly from the others. In Correia, neither of the Sodré brothers command their own ships - indeed Correia asserts Vicente Sodré was carried as a passenger aboard Vasco da Gama's flagship, with the result that the lead ship of the second squadron was captained by a certain Fernão d'Atouguia (of the Ataíde family?) and the fifth ship by Pêro Rafael (a name that appears on several other lists).Among other variations given in Gaspar Correia's (p.266) list, in the first squadron are Francisco Marecos (prob. nickname of Francisco da Cunha), Rui da Cunha (= Rui de Castanheda) and Antão Vaz (= António do Campo). Variations of the second square are, as mentioned, Fernam d'Atouguia (instead of Vicente Sodré) and Pêro Rafael (instead of Brás Sodré). But it is the composition of the third squad (p.288) that Correia really parts ways: only Estevão da Gama is named properly; the other four are given as Vasco Fernandes Tinoco, João Fernandes de Mello, Rui Lourenço Ravasco and Diogo Fernandes 'Peteira'. But the latter two (Ravasco & 'Peteira') were members of the third squadron led by António de Saldanha that was sent out with Afonso de Albuquerque's 5th Armada the next year (1503)! (adding to the confusion, Correia also suggests that Saldanha was aboard this one as a passenger.) Evidently, Correia mixes up the third squadrons of two different armadas (it would be simply impossible for Saldanha, Ravasco and Peteira to return to Portugal on time to depart again on the next armada). Doubtless, the captain lists are complicated by the fact that there was a rearrangement of the fleet in India, and captains were shuffled around - at which point, both Vicente and Brás Sodré was definitely given command of a ship of his own.] The most famous ship in the Fourth Armada was arguably the one commanded by Estevão da Gama, the Flor de la Mar (sometimes spelled as Frol de la Mar), a 400 tonne carrack (nau), the largest ship of that kind yet built.The Flor de la Mar is identified in the eyewitness accounts of Thomé Lopes (p.169) and Matteo da Bergamo (p.111). The exact sizes of the other large carracks - the flagship São Jerónimo, Lionarda and the Leitoa/''Esmeralda'' are unknown, but also presumed to be quite sizeable (that is, 250t or greater).e.g. Lopes (p.189) explicitly names four ships - the flagship, the Flor, the Lionarda and the Esmeralda as much larger than all the others. The Esmeralda is not on Correia's original list. But later in the narrative, Correia (p.291) insinuates that the Esmeralda and Leitoa Nova are one and the same ship. These large ships were designated to return with spice cargo back to Lisbon. The smaller naus(navetas, 80-120t) and caravels (40-80t), went out as armed fighting ships, to remain as naval patrol vessels in India if necessary. The Gama clan dominated the fleet - Vasco da Gama, his cousin Estêvão da Gama and his uncles Vicente Sodré and Brás Sodré took the leadership positions. We have assumed Pêro de Ataíde, to be the same person nicknamed 'o Inferno' ('Hell'), a notable veteran captain of Cabral's Second Armada. But in some accounts, his name is given as 'Álvaro de Ataíde' a native of the Algarve,e.g. Barros (p.21) thus possibly Vasco da Gama's new brother-in-law (Gama had recently married Catarina de Ataíde in 1500 or 1501; she had a brother by that name).Aubin (1995:p.16) notes that there were two unnconnected 16th-century Portuguese noble families which happened to have the same name - the Ataídes of Atouguia and the Ataídes of Alvor (Algarve). Pêro de Ataíde 'O Inferno' is from the first. Catarina de Ataíde (Vasco da Gama's wife) is from the latter. This has not prevented some chroniclers from assuming that Pêro de Ataíde was a relative of Gama's (e.g. Correia, p.301). One possible resolution is that the São Paulo nau was indeed taken by Gama's brother-in-law Álvaro de Ataíde to India and back and that Pêro de Ataíde went as a passenger, and was only given a ship in India, when the coastal patrol was formed. Lopo Mendes de Vasconcellos was a soon-to-be brother-in-law (betrothed to Teresa da Gama, Vasco's sister). Among the remaining captains, the most significant was probably Dom Luís Coutinho, son of the Count of Marialva, a high nobleman of considerable rank in the Portuguese court. Diogo Fernandes Correia (archaically, Corrêa) was pre-designated by the Casa da India as the factor for Cochin (replacing the factor Gonçalo Gil Barbosa that Cabral had left there). Two ships went out under Italian captains - Tommasio da Cremona ('Thomas de Carmona') and Giovanni Buonagrazia ('João da Bonagracia') of FlorenceLopes (Ital.: p.147, Port: p.174) and likely to be outfitted in collaboration with Italian consortiums (although Buonagrazia's ship is identified as formally belonging to Ruy Mendes de Brito, a gentleman of the royal chamber Lopes (Port: p.173). It was not uncommon for foreign financiers to draft a well-connected high noble to place his name at the head of their financial consortium. Lopo Dias is identified by Barros as an employee of D. Álvaro of Braganza, who had privately outfitted ships in earlier armadas in conjunction with the Marchionni consortium, so there is reason to presume Dias's ship was outfitted the same way.Indeed, Matteo da Bergamo (p.111) seems to refer to Lopo Dias's ship as the "nave de Bartolomeo", almost surely a reference to Marchionni. The Leitoa Nova is said to have been privately outfitted by the powerful nobleman Tristão da Cunha in conjunction with the mysterious Lisbon merchant-woman Catarina Dias de Aguiar Subrahmanyam, 1997: p.237 Aboard the ships, as passengers, were Gaspar da Gama (the Goese Jew brought by Gama's first journey, who had also served as translator in the Cabral armada), an ambassador from the Kolathiri Raja of Cannanore and one of two noble Cochinese hostages taken inadvertently by Cabral's Second India Armada back to Lisbon (the other Cochinese hostage elected to stay in Lisbon, dispatching a letter to Trimumpara Raja, prince of Cochin relating the useful role he might serve Cochin by remaining behind in the Portuguese court.) There were two Italian passengers on the armada - both military engineers, and probably secret Venetian agents - that would play a sinister role in India. They were known by their Portuguese names as João Maria (Gianmaria) and Pêro António (Pierantonio).Although often characterized as 'Milanese' (e.g. Osório, p.223), Faria e Sousa (1666: p.57) identifies them as "Christians of Slavonia" who "made this trip for the Republic of Venice". The 4th Armada is unusually blessed with multiple eyewitness accounts to supplement the standard chronicles: (1) an account by an anonymous Flemish sailor aboard the Leitoa Nova in the second squadron, (2) an account by anonymous Portuguese sailor; (3) a brief account by an anonymous German sailor; (4) a detailed account by Thomé Lopes, clerk of the ship of Giovanni Buonagrazia in the third squadron; (5) two letters dispatched from Mozambique in April 1503 by an Italian agent Matteo da Bergamo, who, by deduction, was travelling on T. Carmona's ship (6) letters dispatched from Lisbon by Italian agents Francesco Corbinelli and Giovanni Francesco Affaitati drawn from interviews with the newly returning crews in August 1503.The eyewitness accounts introduce a few personal names not seen on the chroniclers's list. It is highly probable that most of these names refer not to captains, but rather to the owners of their respective ships, e.g. when Bergamo refers to the "nave de Ruy Mendes", he doubtlessly means the ship owned by Ruy Mendes de Brito and captained by Buonagrazia. Similarly we can deduce the "nave de Bartolomeo" as being the ship captained by Lopo Dias, owned by Braganza-Marchionni. More uncertain are the "ship of João da Fonseca" (possibly the Santa Elena or Bretoa, the one that foundered on the Sofala banks), the "ship of Ruy de Figueiredo" (identified as the Santo António by Bergamo, but not on Correia's list) and the ship of "Fernando Lourenço" (= ?). The eyewitness accounts certainly seem to suggest a higher degree of private participation in this fleet than the chroniclers reveal. The mission The principal mission of the 4th Armada was to settle scores with the Zamorin of Calicut. This was not a diplomatic mission, but a military one. The armada was to avenge the Zamorin's mistreatment of Cabral and the massacre of the Portuguese in the Calicut factory (see 2nd India Armada for details). The Fourth Armada did not set out with enough manpower to conquer Calicut outright. Rather, they expected a strong show of force was enough to intimidate the Zamorin into compliance. They would do this by cutting off Calicut's lifeline - its trade. In the pre-launch plans, the first squadron under Vasco da Gama was supposed to set up a naval blockade of Calicut harbor and prevent the entry of any ships, while the second squadron of Vicente Sodré was to patrol the Gulf of Aden and bottle up Arab shipping in the Red Sea. This, it was thought, would be enough to bring the Zamorin to his knees and sue for terms. The terms envisaged was for the Zamorin to make amends for the factory and restore the Portuguese trade on the Malabar coast (Gama was under instructions to accept nothing less than a fixed price guarantee this time). The Zamorin would also be obliged to prosecute those they identified as the intriguers behind the massacre and expel all Arab merchants from any and all ports under Calicut's sway. The armada is said by the chroniclers to have been given explicit instructions to establish factories (feitorias) in Cochin and Cannanore, Calicut's rival cities on the Malabar coast of India, which had opened good relations with Cabral. However, we know of only one designated crown factor carried by the Fourth Armada - Diogo Fernandes Correia. This has led some historians to suspect that maybe this was only a back-up plan at best. In other words, that it was envisaged that once the quarrel with the Zamorin was resolved, Portuguese operations would be centered on Calicut again, with Diogo Fernandes Correia as factor there, and that the other smaller cities, with their smaller markets, would just fade again into the background. Finally, the Fourth Armada was instructed to open trade with the East African city-state of Sofala. Sofala had been secretly visited by the explorer Pêro da Covilhã during his overland expedition back in 1487, and he identified it as the end-point of the Monomatapa gold trade. The Portuguese crown had been eager to tap that gold source, but all prior armadas had failed to find it until Sancho de Tovar, commanding a ship of the 2nd India Armada, had finally located Sofala the previous year, but he only saw it from afar and did not go ashore. It seems that every ship in this armada was issued explicit royal instructions to try to trade for gold in Sofala.Matteo Bergamo (p.111). Outward Journey February 10, 1502 Two squadrons of the Fourth Armada - 10 ships under admiral Vasco da Gama and 5 ships under vice-admiral Vicente Sodré- set out from Lisbon. Late February, 1502 - Fleet anchors in Senegal (either at Porto de Ale (Sali Portudal) or Bezeguiche (Bay of Dakar)) to take water. It is reported in one chronicle that Fernan d'Atouguia, captain of the Leitoa Nova falls ill and dies here.Correia, p.271 Gama transfers the experienced captain Pedro Afonso de Aguiar from the small nau Santa Elena to the large nau Leitoa Nova, and elevates one of his own companions, Pêro de Mendonça, to captain Aguiar's old ship. Early March, 1502 - The Fourth Armada sails southwest from Africa and may make a brief watering stop at Cape St. Augustine (Brazil), before heading across the south Atlantic towards the Cape of Good Hope. April 1, 1502 The third squadron of the Fourth Armada - five ships under Estêvão da Gama - finally sets out from Lisbon. Charting its own course, the third squadron will only catch up with the main body of the Fourth Armada in India. April–May, 1502 Violent storms at the Cape separates the fifteen ships of Vasco da Gama's fleet. Each captain is forced to figure out his own passage around the Cape, and make his own way towards the pre-arranged rendez-vous point on the other side. May, 1502 After making watering stops in Madeira and Cape Verde, Estevão da Gama's third squadron reportedly spots an island in the south Atlantic. Uncertain which one - could be a Cape Verde island or the Penedo de São Pedro (islets off the Brazilian coast) or even as far as the islands of Trindade and Martim Vaz (further south), but does not stop to investigate.In his on-board diary, Thomé Lopes (Port: p.160) reports seeing an unknown island on May 18th, and gives its position - albeit in relation to other islands which are also not clear (e.g. 'Island of the Red Parrots' = Brazil?). Sailing on a different ship in the same squadron, Matteo da Bergamo (p.99) also reports seeing an unknown island on May 18th on the outgoing journey. (By coincidence, that very same month, the returning Third Armada of João da Nova discovers the island of Saint Helena; despite the timing, the returning fleet will not encounter any of the ships of the outward armada. But they will pick up letters Nova left behind in Malindi, probably describing his outgoing journey and the latest news from India) June 7, 1502 - The third squadron of Estevão da Gama is caught in a terrible storm around the Cape and splits into two groups - Estevão da Gama (Flor) and the ships of Lopo Dias and Thomaz de Carmona (with Bergamo on board) hold together as a trio, while Lopo Mendes de Vasconcellos (Julia) and the ship of Buonagrazia (with Lopes on board) form a separate pair.Matteo da Bergamo (p.111) reports that the 'Galiana' (evidently Bergamo's nickname for Vasconcellos's Julioa) and the 'nave de Ruy Mendes' (de Brito, i.e. Buonagrazia's ship, carrying T. Lopes) was separated from the 'fior de la mar' (E. da Gama), the 'nave de Bartolomeo' (Marchionni, i.e. Lopo Dias) and 'noi' ('us', by elimination, Thomaz de Carmona evidently). Lopes (Port. p.160) confirms being left alone with the Julia. Contact with Sofala, Factory in Mozambique c. June 10, 1502 - Chronicles differ on what exactly happens after the first squadrons double the Cape. Following the account of Gaspar Correia (p. 272), Vasco da Gama was the among the first ships to arrive in Mozambique Island, the pre-arranged meeting point. Gama is immediately recognized by the local sheikh (with whom Gama had a tussle on his first journey back in 1498).Correia (p.272). However, Barros (p.29) and Gois (p.89) says Gama met a different sheikh of Mozambique, not the sheikh 'Zacoeja' from the first voyage. The Mozambique ruler immediately offers his pardon for that affair and puts supplies at the disposal of the tempest-tossed Portuguese. Vasco da Gama remains in Mozambique for a while, waiting for the rest of the battered fleet to trickle in, one by one. The only known loss is the small nau Santa Elena, captained by the novice Pêro de Mendonça, which captured by bad currents around Cape Correntes, ends up running aground near the banks of Sofala.Correia (p.272). Castanheda (p.131) suggests it was Antonio Fernandes Roxo (Bretoa?) that ran aground near the Sofala banks. Both Matteo da Bergamo and the anonymous Portuguese eyewitness says it was the ship of 'João da Fonseca' (not on usual captain lists, probably the ship's owner's name). However the crew is safely rescued by the passing ships of Francisco da Cunha Mareco (Bretoa) and Fernão Rodrigues Bardaças (Santa Marta).Slightly different names are given in Correia (p.272) With surfeit of crew from the capsized Santa Elena, Gama orders the construction of a whole new caravel from scratch on Mozambique Island.Correia (p.272), Barros (p.28) and Gois (p.88) reports the ships were already carrying timber from Portugal for that purpose. not mentioned in all sources, the caravel of [[António do Campo] ('Antão Vaz' in Correia), is said to have been badly battered at Cape Correntes, and drifted backwards into Delagoa Bay (Maputo). Campo will not rejoin the 4th Armada on time for the Indian Ocean crossing, and thus remain stuck in Africa until next year. See below.Theal (1896: 95-96); also Barros (p.33), Osório (p.194)] According to Correia, while repairing on Mozambique Island, Vasco da Gama dispatches Pedro Afonso de Aguiar (captain of the Leitoa) and two caravels south to the city of Sofala, the entrepot of the Monomatapa gold trade.Correia, p.272 Sofala had been missed by all prior armadas, but not this time. Following up on the scout report of Sancho de Tovar from the previous year (see 2nd India Armada), Aguiar leads the first Portuguese ships into Sofala harbor. Aguiar goes ashore, initiates some trade in the local markets while seeking out the local ruler, the sultan or shiekh Isuf of Sofala (Yçuf in Barros; Çufe in Goes). An audience is arranged and Aguiar draws up a commercial and alliance treaty between Portugal and Sofala. Matters settled and gifts exchanged, Aguiar takes aboard a Sofalese ambassador to meet Vasco da Gama back in Mozambique. other accounts, (principally [[Jerónimo Osório|Osório] (p. 192), mildly corroborated by other chroniclers and the anonymous Portuguese eyewitness and Matteo da Bergamo) it is Vasco da Gama himself, and not Aguiar, who goes to Sofala. According to this alternative account, Gama did not go to Mozambique immediately after the Cape crossing; rather, most of the fleet met at some unnamed bay just a few leagues north of Sofala (possibly the 'Rio dos Boms Sinaes'); Gama ordered Vicente Sodré with the main fleet ahead to Mozambique Island, while he remained behind Barros (p.28) and Gois (p.89) identify Sodré. Castanheda (p.130-31) says it was Pedro Afonso de Aguiar that led the fleet to Mozambique while Gama took four naus to Sofala. The construction of the new caravel was thus overseen by Sodré, not Gama. After accounting for all the ships and sending them on to Mozambique, Vasco da Gama himself sailed south with four ships to Sofala, conducted some trade and opened the first contact with the Sofalese ruler.Matteo da Bergamo (p.111), who wasn't there, reports that he was later told that Vasco da Gama, and three additional ships the Sao Gabriel (of Gil Matoso?), the Santo António of 'Ruy e Figaretto' ('Ruy de Figueiredo') and the ship of "Giovan d'Anfonsechebran" ('João da Fonseca') had gone to Sofala and traded goods for 2500 meticals. The Flemish sailor (p.60-61) reports they alighted at Sofala ('Scafal') first and sailed to Mozambique ('Miskebije') later, although makes no mention of whom went where. He only reports the Sofalese "refused to trade" and lived in great fear of 'paepians' (Bantus?). He doesn't report entering the city (indeed, implied the city was hidden). Barros (p.28) mentions only that Gama went to Sofala with four ships and did a little trading, but doesn't report any treaty. Castanheda (p.130) reports Gama did "establish friendship" with the ruler. That would mean Gama was the last to arrive in Mozambique. In this alternative account, the lost ship of Mendonça (or Fernandes) was one of the four that went with Gama to Sofala, and capsized while exiting the Sofala banks.] possible reconciliation of both versions may be that Gama did go to Sofala, but did not actually enter the city itself, but limited himself to try to trade for gold with Sofalese merchants by the outer sandbanks of the Sofala estuary, and later on (after arriving in Mozambique) instructed Aguiar to go back and venture inside the city. Late June, 1502 - Vasco da Gama makes arrangements to leave Mozambique. A Portuguese factory is established on Mozambique Island, with Gonçalo Baixo as the factor, with some ten assistants, to capitalize on the results of the Sofala trade mission.Correia (p.275). Castanheda (p.131) The new caravel finished, Gama christens it Pomposa and places it, together with some 30 crew, under the command of João Serrão (of future Magellan fame), with instructions to take any goods from the Sofalese trade.Correia (p.275) Barros (p.29), Gois (p.89). to Correia, Gama was unwilling to wait around for the results of Aguiar's mission to Sofala, and set sail out of Mozambique before Aguiar's returned from Sofala. As a result, Aguiar was forced to leave the Sofalese ambassador in Mozambique (letting him find his own way back home) and set sail for Malindi, hoping to catch Gama there.Correia, p.275 Extortion of Kilwa held formal sway from Malindi in the north, to Cape Correntes in the south.]] Gama had gone first to Kilwa (Quiloa). The dominant city-state on the East African coast, Kilwa Sultanate was the formal overlord of Mozambique and Sofala. If the fledgling Portuguese trade presence in those East African towns was to remain unmolested, then the Portuguese must secure Kilwa's consent. Cabral and the 2nd Armada had tried, and failed, to secure a treaty with Kilwa back in 1500. Gama decided to try again - and was determined not to take no for answer. But, mindful of the lesson at Calicut, Gama also wanted to add a touch of intimidation, to show off his heavily-armed fleet and impress upon the Sultan of Kilwa the consequences of interfering or turning back on any agreement. July 12, 1502 - Gama's large, menacing armada arrives at the island-city of Kilwa. Gama sends for the Kilwa ruler, Emir Ibrahim, inviting him aboard the São Jeronimo, to negotiate a treaty of peace and trade.The actual Kilwa sultan al-Fudail had been recently (c. 1499) deposed and murdered by his chief minister, Emir Ibrahim (known as Mir Habrahemo in Barros, Abraemo in Góis), who had gone on to rule without a sultan. To maintain constitutional propriety, Emir Ibrahim claimed to rule in the name of a mysterious descendant of some earlier sultan, who (quite conveniently) nobody had seen or heard of for over a decade. It is known that Isuf of Sofala, a loyalist of the late sultan al-Fudail, refused to recognize Emir Ibrahim's usurpation, which may help explain why he agreed so readily to Aguiar's proposal to enter into an alliance with the Portuguese. Sensing a trap, Emir Ibrahim first asks for a safe-conduct (which da Gama promptly gives him), but fearing treachery, the emir changes his mind, and refuses to go aboard. However, after much discussion, one of his advisors, a certain wealthy nobleman Muhammad ibn Rukn ad Din (called Muhammad Arcone or Ancone or Enconij by the chroniclers It is 'Masamede Arcone' in Correia (p.278), 'Mahomet Ancon' in Osório (p.194), 'Mahamade Enconij' in Barros (p.32), 'Masamede Enconij' in Góis (p.89), 'Masamede Alconez' in Castanheda (p.131)) finally persuades the emir to take up the Portuguese offer. Emir Ibrahim is ferried to the flagship and climbs aboard. After minimal opening cordialities, and ostentatious proclamations of friendship, Gama lays down his price: a treaty with Portugal has to be paid for with a hefty cash tribute to the King of Portugal. The emir is dismayed. Declaring tribute to be a dishonor, he refuses. Gama threatens to level the city and lay it to fire and waste. Emir Ibrahim, effectively captive on board, reluctantly agrees, and signs a treaty making Kilwa tributary to Portugal. Leaving the Kilwan nobleman and advisor Muhammad Arcone aboard as a hostage, the emir returns to shore to make the arrangements. mid-July, 1502 - After a few days of lingering in Kilwa harbor and no sign of the emir's promised tribute, Gama dispatches a messenger to see what the delay is. Emir Ibrahim sends a message back declining to dispatch the tribute, and telling the Portuguese captain-major that he can do whatever he will with the hostage Muhammad Arcone, given that his poor counsel had proven him unworthy. The angry Gama throws Arcone into a long-boat, without water or shade, to die of heat and exposure. Nonetheless, Muhammad Arcone is a wealthy man in his own right, and servants from his household offer Gama a substantial ransom to release him. Knowing the hostage is otherwise worthless to him, Gama consents. July 20, 1502 - His vengeance on Muhammad Arcone's bad counsel satisfied, the Emir Ibrahim of Kilwa finally decides to send some tribute - some 1500 gold meticals''Barros (p.115) asserts 500 meticals, but this is likely an error. The anonymous Fleming and Matteo da Bergamo both report a tribute of 1500 meticals, and this is corroborated in a later letter from King Manuel to Vasco da Gama. Gois (p.89) and Castanheda (p.131) report 2,000 meticals. Peragallo (1902: p.99) provides different estimates of its worth: a ''metical is worth 1 Venetian ducat (estimate of Cadamosto), 1.33 ducats (estimate of Thome Lopes, p.164), 2.75 ducats (Corbinelli), 9 sous & 4 deniers of Flemish money (estimate of anonymous Fleming, p.55/61); 420 Portuguese reales (Barros estimate, p.115), 500 reals (estimate of Correia p.274). - to satisfy the Portuguese captain-major. Vasco da Gama, anxious not to miss the monsoon winds to India, takes what he can get.The Portuguese account of events up to here seems to correspond quite well with a contemporary Kilwan account. See Strong (1895) extorted gold coins of Kilwa were used by the goldsmith [[Gil Vicente] in 1506 to make the famous gold pyx or monstrance known as the Custódia de Belém, for the Jerónimos Monastery in Belém. It is considered by many to be one the most magnificent treasure pieces of the Portuguese crown.] (p. 282) reports a little knot before departing: several dozen Kilwan women 'picked up' (read: abducted) and taken aboard the ships by bored Portuguese sailors for fun and amusement refuse to return ashore. Although Emir Ibrahim promises that they will be unharmed, he cannot guarantee that those who allowed themselves to be baptized Christian by enthusiastic chaplains on the ships will be taken back by their families. Much to the delight of the crew, Gama reluctantly allows these to come with them. c. July 15, 1502 In the meantime, part of the third squadron, the trio that held with Estêvão da Gama (Gama, Dias, Carmona) arrive at Mozambique Island, half-famished and heavily damaged. At that same time, the remaining pair (Vasconcellos, Buonagrazia) alight at the Sofala banks. The two squads do not reconnect with each other. Estêvão da Gama's trio, following the itinerary left in Mozambique by his cousin, heads off to Kilwa According to Bergamo (p.111), the squadron had royal instructions to go trade in Sofala. But Estêvão da Gama set that aside, evidently feeling it more important to connect with the main fleet - perhaps hoping that Vasconcellos-Buonagrazia might be there. Alone idling before Sofala, Vasconcellos and Buonagrazia proceed north to the mouth of the Rio de Bons Sinaes (Zambezi River), where they put in for repairs and recuperation. July 23, 1502 Part of the third squad (Estêvão da Gama, Lopo Dias and Thomas de Carmona) arrive in Kilwa, just in time to reconnect the main armada of Vasco da Gama, preparing to depart fom Kilwa harbor.Bergamo (p.111). Also asserted by Gois (p.89). However Correia (p.287) and Barros (p.32) say Estêvão da Gama's squad only met with the main fleet in the Indian Ocean crossing, after Malindi. Evidently they might be confusing Estêvão's trio (who met in Kilwa) with the Vasconcelos-Buonagrazia pair (who met in India). At that moment (July 22 actually), the remaining two ships of the third squad (Vasconcellos, Buonagrazia) finally arrive in Mozambique Island. Taking note of the notes and itinerary left behind, they set sail for Malindi, hoping to catch the main fleet there. Late July, 1502 - Vasco da Gama arrives in Malindi, just in time to be met by Pedro Afonso de Aguiar (from Sofala), who reports to him the results of the Sofala treaty.Correia, p.284 Gama's fleet does not actually dock in Malindi - they intended to, but miss it, landing a few leagues ahead, unable to turn back because of the weather (although they manage to get some supplies and exchange messages with Malindi emissaries that row out to them).Barros (v.2, p.32), Gois (p.89). Correia (p.284) suggests the sultan rowed out to their anchorage to meet them. Eyewitness Matteo da Bergamo (p.112) estimates they anchored some 5 leagues beyond Malindi. This is confirmed by Lopes (p.167-68). The anonymous Fleming says they missed Malindi and ended up at 'Cape of St. Mary' ('cape sinte maria'), between the lands of Arabia and Prester John, which the editor chose to identify as Ras Mory on Socotra island. This is highly unlikely. Socotra had yet to be discovered, it was still a quite a way from Malindi, and could not have been reached in time for an Indian Ocean crossing. It seems evident, from the awelike wonder of his account, that this is the Flemish sailor's first journey to India, that these locations are not familiar at all to him, and he is probably filling in the blanks imaginatively. July 29, 1502 - Vasco da Gama's fleet departs its anchorage near Malindi for its Indian Ocean crossing. He is missing three ships: Campo, Vasconcelos and Buonagrazia. August 2, 1502 - The remaining two ships of the third squadron (Lopo Mendes de Vasconcelos and Giovanni Buonagrazia) arrive in Malindi, just a few days after Gama's departure. They are well received by the Sultan of Malindi.Lopes (port: p.166) They pick up a few letters left with degredado Luiz da Moura in Malindi by the returning fleet of João da Nova a few months earlier, reporting the latest Indian news.Subrahmanyam (1997: 201) says Nova actually left these letters in Kilwa, where Gama picked them up. This is weakly corroborated in Lopes (Port: p.168), who suggests that Nova's letters were left in Kilwa, picked up by Gama, then sent by messenger to Malindi with Gama's instructions, and that Lopes picked up both together. Correia (p.284) suggests the sultan of Malindi himself delivered the Nova news to Gama, when he sailed out to meet them at their anchorage. Barros (p.29) suggests Gama picked up Nova's letter much earlier, from the hand of the Sheikh of Mozambique. They do not stay long, but immediately set sail after Gama's fleet. Campo in Delagoa Bay The last missing ship - António do Campo's caravel from the first squadron - will not make it across to India this year. As already alluded to earlier, the caravel of António do Campo ('Antão Vaz' in Correia) is said to have been caught up and battered by bad winds at Cape Correntes and forced to drift with the current of the Mozambique Channel aimlessly southwest. Campo's caravel is said to have alighted at Delagoa Bay (now Maputo Bay). The hitherto unknown capacious bay is watered by three rivers: the Maputo river to the south, the Espirito Santo 'river' to the west (actually an estuary formed by the Umbeluzi, Matola and Tembe rivers) and the Maniça (now Incomati) river to the north. Being told by the local inhabitants that the Espírito Santo 'river' was sourced from a great lake deep in the interior, Campo names it Rio da Lagoa (River of the Lagoon), from which we get the name by which Maputo Bay was long known: 'Delagoa Bay'.Theal (1896: p.95-96) Having been forced to linger at Delagoa for repairs, António do Campo hurries north to try to make junction with the rest of the 4th Armada at Malindi, but arrives too late (mid-September). The fleet having already left for India, and the monsoon winds preventing Campo's own crossing to India. António do Campo will remain behind on the East African coast until next April.Barros (p.33), Theal (1896:p.96) Gama in India mid-August, 1502 - After its Indian Ocean crossing, the Fourth Armada alights near the opulent port of Dabul (north of Goa).Correia (p.288) is the only one of the principal chroniclers who mentions arriving in Dabul. This is corroborated by the eyewitness Matteo da Bergamo (p.113), who cites alighting at "Bul" or "abul" on August 11 (a very quick crossing, if the date is to be believed) and remained in the environs for five days. The Flemish sailor (p.62) says they arrived on Aug 21 at the large trading city of Camabem (evidently confusing Dabul with Cambay), and colorfully goes on to claim it lay in the Biblical lands of 'Chaldea' and 'Babylon', not far from Mecca "where is buried Mahomet the devil of the pagans" (p.62). These are the territorial waters of the powerful Muslim sultan Adil Shah (Hidalcão) of Bijapur. Expecting trouble, the fighting ships hoist up their lateen sails and load up their cannon. But no one comes out to challenge them, so they begin coasting south along the Indian coast towards Kerala.Correia, p.288. Although not there, Lopes (p.171) reports from hearsay some of Gama's adventures around Dabul. Actions at Onor and Batecala c. August 20, 1502 Bergamo (p.113) says they arrived at Anjediva on Aug. 18 Gama's fleet reaches Anjediva island. The next day, the ships of Giovanni Buonagrazia (carrying Thomé Lopes) and Lopo Mendes de Vasconcellos (Juiloa) finally catch up with the rest of the armada.See Lopes (Port: p.171). Also insinuated by Barros (p.32-33). Earlier (p.170), Lopes mentioned Buonagrazia parted company from Vasconcellos at Malindi. This is corroborated in Bergamo (p.114), who asserts that only Buonagrazia met them in Anjediva, while the 'San Giuliano' (i.e. Vasconcellos's Julioa) was only met later, waiting for them near Mount d'Eli. Save for the ship of Campo (still stuck in Africa) and Serrão (on patrol around the Mozambique factory), all the Portuguese fleet (18 ships out of the 20 that left Lisbon) are together and accounted for. The Flemish sailor (p.62) reports 300 sick and injured at Anjediva. Bergamo (p.101) estimates deaths on the entire fleet at this stage was 60-70 sailors and ship-boys, which he considers lucky. Around Anjediva island, the armada spots three boats belonging to Timoja, the Hindu privateer who operates out of Honnavar (Onor), on the frontline between the warring states of Muslim Bijapur and Hindu Vijayanagar.Correia, p.289 They give chase unto the mouth of the Sharavathi River, at which point the pirate boats slip into harbor of Onor. Assured by Gaspar da Gama (Goese Jew and translator) that Onor is a corsair's nest, Vasco da Gama orders an attack on the city. Portuguese landing crews attack the harbor, plundering and setting fire to the ships and docks.The attack on Onor and Batecala are not reported by any chronicler, except Gaspar Correia (p.289-91). Eyewitnesses Thomé Lopes and Matteo Bergamo are curiously silent, although it is possible that they did not participate or had been sent on ahead. The Flemish sailor, however, relates (p.62) that they reached "Oan" (Onor?), seized 400 ships and killed their crews (attack on Onor harbor?), then went on to defeat a king who is said to own 8,000 horses and 700 war elephants (a reference to the Vijaynagara emperor Narasimha Raya II, suzerain of Onor and Batecala?). Colorful confusion aside, the Fleming seems to corroborate Correia's account of some action here. The day after the raid on Onor, the Fourth Armada arrives at the mouth of the river that leads up to the city of Bhatkal (Batecala), south of Onor. Perceiving what he considers hostile gestures from shore, the captain-major dispatches his cousin, Estêvão da Gama upriver to the town to investigate. Surveying the Batecala docks, Estêvão spies several Arab merchant ships and prepares for hostilities. But his attention is soon drawn to a small group of men in ornate robes, rushing down to the docks, frantically calling to him. It is an embassy from the raja of Batecala, requesting an immediate audience with the Portuguese captain-major. Estêvão brings the embassy to his cousin. Evidently hearing of the fate of Onor, the embassy offers to submit to the Portuguese. Vasco da Gama agrees to leave Batecala in peace in return for a yearly tribute of 1,000 bags of plain rice and 500 bags of quality rice (probably Basmati). Batecala is also to agree to the exclusion of the Arab merchants from the city, that no pepper trade is to be carried at this port, and that no ship be allowed to travel between Batecala and Calicut. The treaty is set down in writing and signed.Correia, p.290-91 is described by Correia as just a modest rice, iron and sugar port south of Onor; it was actually the principal port and sea outlet of the [[Vijayanagara Empire], and its primary line was the horse trade, specifically, importing large numbers of splendid Persian and Arabian horses for the armies of Vijayanagara princes.Subrahmanyam(1997: p.100)] Massacre of the Pilgrim Ship Late August/Early September 1502 - Business in Batecala done, Vasco da Gama sets sail towards Cannanore. They anchor in around Mount d'Eli, the common touch-point for ships on the Jedda-Calicut route, evidently intending to catch some prizes before proceeding. September 29, 1502 - After prowling around Mt. d'Eli for nearly a month with little success (they captured only one minor shipBergamo (p.101). This was probably the zambuco reported by Lopes (p.173)), captain Gil Matoso (on the São Gabriel), spots a large merchant ship carrying Muslim pilgrims returning from Mecca (or going to it, chronicles contradict). The ship, the Miri, is identified as belonging to a certain al-Fanqi, one of wealthier men of Calicut and said by some to be the Meccan factor in Calicut.Lopes (p.175) and Barros (p.34) suggest this. Correia (p.292) just calls him a rich man of Calicut, later on (p.300) identifying him as the brother of Calicut noble 'Coja Casem'. Matoso chases the pilgrim ship down,Lopes (p.174-75), Barros (p.35) which surrenders rather quickly, probably imagining that its master had enough money to ransom it off. But Vasco da Gama shrugs off all the offers. As the Portuguese crew plunder the ship and transfer its cargo, it quickly becomes evident that Gama intends to burn the ship with all its passengers - men, women and children - on board. When Gama proves deaf to their pleas for mercy, the passengers frantically attack the Portuguese men-at-arms with their bare hands. To no avail. October 3, 1502 - a day, eyewitness Thomé Lopes states, "I will never forget for the rest of my days"."che in tutti i di di mia vita mi ricordero" (Lopes, Ital: p.147) "de que me lembrarei toda a minha vida" (Lopes, Port: p.177) The pilgrim ship thoroughly plundered, on Gama's orders, the passengers are locked in the hold and the ship burnt and sunk by artillery. It takes several days to finally go down completely. Portuguese soldiers row around the waters on longboats mercilessly spearing survivors.Correia (p.293-4); Lopes (p.177ff) The sinking of the Miri is an act that will instantly cement Gama's cruel and fearsome reputation, and generate a great deal of hatred for the Portuguese in India. Gama defended his act as "vengeance" for the Calicut massacre of 1500, arguing that the ship's owner, as a prominent person in Calicut, was 'doubtlessly' responsible for the sinister counsel to the Zamorin that led up to it.Correia, p.292 Of the eyewitnesses, all mention it, but only Thomé Lopes openly condemns the act, claiming Gama acted "with great cruelty and without any mercy whatsoever"."com muita crueldade, e sem comiserção alguma" (Lopes, Port: p.179) The chroniclers do not shy away from describing the event and their unease is evident. Although Barros and Castanheda reiterate Gama's justification of the act as revenge for Cabral, they do not seem to embrace it themselves.Barros (p.34, 43) Castanheda, p.132 Indeed, Barros, Góis and Osório claim the ship belonged to the Sultan of Egypt, who was in no way responsible for the events in Calicut, thus subtly suggesting Gama may have made a mistake.Barros (p.34), Góis (p.89), Osório (p.195). By contrast, Correia (p.300) asserts it was really Calicut-owned. Modern historian Bouchon (1975: 62) suggests it might actually have been Gujarati. Gaspar Correia is a little more open in his disapproval. He notes that several of the Portuguese captains were appalled by Gama's decision and tried to persuade him against it (if only because they would forego a hefty ransom).Correia, p.293 Correia gives a heart-rending account of the desperate and valiant resistance of the doomed passengers.Correia (p.249) famously ends his account with the story of how one of the pilgrim survivors, swimming in the water, grabbed a loose spear, threw it and killed one of the Portuguese soldiers on the longboats. "And for this seeming to be a great thing, I wrote it here." por isto paracer grande cousa o escrevy" Poet Luís de Camões passes over the incident in silence, evidently feeling it detrimental to the heroic portrait of Vasco da Gama.By contrast, the 19th-century history by Cardinal Francisco de São Luiz Saraiva (1849: 211) whitewashes the incident, almost making it seem like an accident, or the result of the 'wickedness of the Moors'. He states that it was the killing of a Portuguese ship-boy in the course of plundering the ship that "scandalized" Gama and prompted a fight, in which the ship was sunk, the Portuguese managing to save only 20 of 300 people aboard. Estimates of those killed on the Miri hover around 300.Barros (p.36) estimates 270 'fighting men', many women and 50 children were aboard. Gois (p.89) says 'more than 300', Castanheda (p.131) says 300 men, plus many women and children; Correia (p.293) puts the death toll at a very high 700. Among the eyewitnesses, the anonymous Flemish sailor (p.62) says 380 men, plus many women and children, while the anonymous Portuguese sailor and Matteo da Bergamo (p.114) put it at 200 men, while Lopes (p.175) says 240 men without counting women and children. Portuguese chroniclers are eager to report that 20 children were spared this fate, and brought back by the 4th Armada to Lisbon, where they will be baptized and raised as friars at the Nossa Senhora de Belém.Gois (p.89), Castanheda (p.132). Barros (p.38), although only a two pages earlier, Barros also takes care to point out that there were 50 children aboard and later on Barros (p.43) diminishes even the merciful aspect of this, by claiming that Gama took the 20 children as an "act of vengeance", because some Arabs had earlier abducted a Portuguese Christian boy, and taken him to Mecca to be raised a Muslim. Among the eyewitnesses Thomé Lopes and the anonymous Flemish sailor make no mention of this small mercy, although Matteo de Bergamo does point it out.Bergamo (p. 101 and 114). Later on in his account, Thome Lopes does insinuate the presence of children from the Mecca nau. ("algums mancebos que vinhão na náu de Meca", p.196) Factory in Cannanore October 18, 1502 - Vasco da Gama's armada finally reaches Cannanore (Canonor, Kannur), and delivers the Cannanore ambassador that had gone to Lisbon with Cabral's 2nd Armada.Gois (p.90) The Kolathiri Raja of Cannanore invites Gama to come ashore for an elaborate reception, but Gama replies that he swore a personal oath not to set his foot on Indian soil again until his vengeance on Calicut was sated. As a result, the rajah orders a wooden scaffold to be built over the seashore, where they can meet in person without violating the vow.Correia (p.294). Gois (p.90), Castanheda (p.132) and Barros (p.39) mention the scaffold but not the oath. Eyewitness Lopes (p.181) says it was not a personal oath, but part of the royal instructions given to Gama by King Manuel I. Gama presents the raja with royal letters and munificent gifts (a jeweled sword, a brocaded armchair) and discussions immediately begin. A commercial treaty is negotiated, establishing a Portuguese crown factory in Cannanore, and arranging a fixed-price schedule, which the Raja personally guarantees, for the sale of spices to the Portuguese. The negotiation for the commercial treaty did not go smoothly, particularly the fixed price clause. The Kolathiri Raja protested that he had no power over market prices nor the right to dictate how private merchants disposed of their property.Barros, p.44 Gama had to resort to feints, threats and then sailed out of Cannanore in anger.Barros, p.46 Barros credits the role of Paio Rodrigues, the Portuguese factor (private, not crown, an employee of the private employee of D. Álvaro of Braganza and the Marchionni consortium), that had been left behind in Cannanore by João da Nova's Third Armada at the beginning of the year. After Gama stormed off and ordered sail out of the city, Paio Rodrigues mediated between the Kolathiri Raja and the Captain-Major and finalized the treaty Barros (p.48). However, prior to this, Lopes (p.183) suggests that Gama was very suspicious of Paio Rodrigues, and even believed that Paio was feeding arguments to the Kolathiri Raja and encouraging his resistance to Gama's proposals. Bergamo (p.102) also reports trouble negotiating prices in Cannanore. Correia points out this is the treaty where the Portuguese cartaz system was first introduced.Correia, p.297-98 Henceforth, every merchant ship along the Malabar coast had to present a certificate signed by a Portuguese factor (in Cannanore, Cochin, etc.), or else be subject to attack and seizure by a Portuguese patrol. This licensing system would be subsequently adopted later on other Portuguese-controlled coasts (e.g. East Africa, Malacca, Brazil), with differing degrees of success.Diffie and Winius (1977:p.321) It will be largely maintained until the 18th century. Bombardment of Calicut October 25, 1502 - Fleet departs Cannanore. Chroniclers differ a little on the subsequent sequence of events. While still in Cannanore, Gama had sent Pedro Afonso de Aguiar to Calicut in advance, with the warning that he had come to settle scores for the mistreatment of Cabral and to get compensation for the overruning of the Calicut factory in 1500. In response, the Zamorin of Calicut sent back a string of messengers to Cannanore (and along the way to Calicut), each delivering promises that the Zamorin was willing to settle matters with Gama, and compensate the Portuguese for the loss of their factory goods.Bergamo (p.102); Barros, p.47-48 On the other hand, Gama also receives a message from Gonçalo Gil Barbosa, the Portuguese crown factor in Cochin, warning him that it was all a tactical ruse, that the Zamorin of Calicut had also dispatched a circular letter to all the lords of the Malabar Coast instructing them to close their ports and markets to the Portuguese.Thomé Lopes (p.184-86). According to Lopes, Barbosa claims the Trimumpara Raja of Cochin showed him the letter and his own reply, refusing the Zamorin's request. October 29, 1502 - Gama's large armada finally arrives before the harbor of Calicut (Calecute, Kozhikode). The Zamorin dispatches an emissary, a Brahmin (dressed as a Christian friar) on a boat to Gama.Correia (p.300), Góis (p.90), Castanheda (p.133), Osório (p.196) say he was dressed in a Franciscan habit taken from one of the Portuguese friars killed in the Calicut massacre of 1500. If so, then this was rather undiplomatic of the Zamorin, and probably didn't help Gama's mood. However, neither Barros nor the eyewitnesses (Lopes, Bergamo) mention his attire. Curiously, Correia (p.300) also notes the Brahmin carried a "white flag tied to a stick as a sign of peace", a rare indication that this apparent European military convention was not unfamiliar in India. The Brahmin reports that the Zamorin had arrested twelve of those responsible for the 1500 riot, and offers a peace and friendship treaty and the opening of a discussion of the restoration of the trade goods seized from the Portuguese factory, albeit noting that the Zamorin has also suffered property damages from Portuguese actions and that he intends to deduct it from the final account.Barros (p.49). Gama is angered, feeling that the Zamorin has changed his tone from his earlier messages, and demands the property taken from the factory be restored in full and brought to his ship, and that all Muslim merchants must be expelled from the Calicut, before any discussion about a treaty begins.Barros (p.49) While awaiting the Zamorin's reply, Gama seizes a nearby idling zambuq and some fishing boats that had unwisely ventured into Calicut harbor, taking some fifty fisherman captive.Góis (p.90), Castanheda (p.133). However, Bergamo (p.116) doesn't report fisherman, but says 38 prisoners were taken captive from a zambuq. Lopes (p.187) says only four fishermen and an empty zambuq were taken; the bulk of the prisoners were from a zambuq captured earlier in Pandarane ('Pantalyini Kollam', now part of Quilandy). Barros (p.46) reports only seizures of handfuls of Malabari prisoners from small boats here and there, that had come to the Portuguese ships to trade or deliver messages along the way. Correia (p.301) reports no prisoners taken at this point, but only later, from a Coromandel rice convoy unlucky enough to show up in Calicut harbor after the bombardment. This action evidently angers the Zamorin, who sends a stern reply to Gama, noting that Gama had already taken severalfold times more property from Calicut ships, and slaughtered ten times more of his citizens (on the Miri, etc.) than the Portuguese lost in the 1500 riot. Despite being the net sufferer and the clamor of his citizens for revenge, the Zamorin is prepared to forgive and forget and start anew.Barros (p. 49) The Zamorin also replies that Calicut is a free port and he has no intention of expelling 'the Moors'.Lopes (p.188) estimates Calicut had 4,000 to 5,000 wealthy Muslim merchant households. Moreover, the Zamorin orders Gama to release his 'hostages', that he will not subject himself to negotiation conditions and that if Gama is unhappy with his offer, then he should leave Calicut harbor at once, for the Zamorin has not given him permission to anchor there, or at any other port in India.Lopes (p.188) October 31, 1502 - Infuriated by the reply, Gama sends out a strongly worded ultimatum, declaring that the Zamorin's permission means nothing to him, that he has until noon the next day to deliver the Portuguese factory goods to his ship.Lopes (p.189); Bergamo (p.116) Gama uses this overnight interlude to send his boats out to sound the harbor of Calicut to find optimal firing positions. That same night, Calicut forces set about frantically digging entrenchments, erecting a protective timber palisade and laying cannon along the harbor shore.Barros, p.51 November 1, 1502 - At noon, having received no reply, Gama orders that his Malabari prisoners be strung up by their necks from the shipmasts, allocating a few to each ship.Bergamo (p.117); Lopes (p.189); Barros (p.52). Calicut crowds approach the beach to watch the grisly spectacle. Then the armada advances into the harbor and opens fire. The bombardment is principally aimed at clearing the beach and trenches.Lopes (p.190), Barros (p.51) The Malabari shore cannons are too few, their range and power too weak, to provide an effective reply.Lopes (p.191) estimates Calicut only deployed some 10 cannon; Bergamo (p.117) reports only 5 or 6, "le quale non erano molto grosse, ma tiraveno tanto bene como le nostre" were not very big, but they were as well-aimed as ours." (p.117). The bombardment continues until nightfall. That night, the corpses of the hung Malabaris are taken from masts, their feet and hands severed off and sent by a small boat to the beach, with an insulting message to the Zamorin, including a demand that the Zamorin reimburse the Portuguese for the powder and shot expended on destroying his city.Lopes (p.190). The severing of the hands-and-feet is confirmed by Bergamo (p.117) and the anonymous Flemish sailor (p.63). November 2, 1502 - The city bombardment resumes the next morning. The mostly poor dwellings on the shore having been razed the previous day, the Portuguese cannons now have a clear view of central city and the statelier homes of the richer citizens of Calicut and bring their larger ordnance to bear.Lopes(p.191) The city is relentlessly bombarded all morning - some 400 large rounds and an indeterminate number from the smaller caliber guns Lopes (p.191); Bergamo (p.117) estimates 300 large rounds and an infinite number of smaller ones. At noon, when the Portuguese pause for lunch, a small group of Malabari vessels tries to attack the idling squad, but are quickly seen off.Lopes (p.191-92) November 3, 1502 - Barros reports that the two-day bombardment had sufficiently crippled the city that several of the captains urge Gama to authorize a landing of troops to sack Calicut. But Gama, still hopeful the Zamorin might come to terms, turns down their request, believing a sack would only escalate matters to the point of no return.Barros, p.53 So, the next morning, vengeance satisfied, Gama sets sail out of Calicut harbor. [In his somewhat different account,Correia, p.300-302 Gaspar Correia does not report the hanging of the prisoners; instead, after the bombardment, while still anchored before the harbor of the smoldering city, the Fourth Armada captures a Coromandel merchant convoy of 2 large ships and 27 small boats unlucky enough to turn up at Calicut at that very moment. Seizing the convoy, Gama orders the cargoes transferred, the crews tied, their teeth beaten out, their noses and hands cut off and the ships set alight. The Brahmin emissary (still being held by the Portuguese) is sent back to shore with a bag full of severed hands and a note for the Zamorin telling him to "make a curry out of them".Correia (p.302). The other chronicles don't report the capture of the rice convoy. However, Bergamo (p.117) and the Flemish sailor (p.63) do report capturing a large ship after the bombardment and quartering its crew.] The violent treatment meted out by Vasco da Gama sends shockwaves throughout the Malabar coast. Merchant ships in Indian ports hurriedly leave the area or go into concealment. All shipping along the coast essentially freezes. The Coastal Patrol Before leaving Calicut, Gama assembles a squadron of five or six fighting ships under Vicente Sodré and his brother Brás Sodré, with some 200 soldiers (mainly crossbowmen), to maintain the blockade on Calicut harbor, and patrol the coast preying on Calicut shipping. The exact composition of the patrol squadron differs in the sources, and it seems there is some reshuffling of captains in the process. The following is only one possible list, compiled from different sources, and should not be taken as authoritative: patrol squadron captains are taken from the lists in [[Fernão Lopes de Castanheda|Castanheda],Castanheda (p.134) reports a squadron of six ships and their captain names as given above. Later, Castanheda (p.140) reports second list, which repeats aforesaid names, but notes that Fernão Rodrigues Bardaças was in place of "D. Antonio Fernandes q se perdeo" (p.140). The loss of Fernandes's ship on the Indian coast is hinted in other chronicles. GóisGóis (p.90) states six ships, and later (p.92) lists the captain names as given in the list. and OsórioOsório (p.195-96, again p.207) says Sodré was left with six ships. The captains names are given later (p.226-27) and are identical to the list above Other sources are not so explicit.Chronicler João de Barros doesn't give a list of captain names nor is clear on the number of ships. Matteo da Bergamo (p.117) reports Gama leaving six patrol ships, three at Calicut, and another three to Cannanore. Thomé Lopes (p.192) reports six naus and a caravel were left with Vicente Sodré. The anonymous Flemish sailor doesn't report a patrol squadron. Subrahmanyam (1997: p.224) says that they left five ships - three naus and two caravels. The ship names are tentatively deduced from Gaspar Correia, who, as usual, deviates in naming the captains.Correia actually provides three separate lists of the patrol captains. His first list (p.301) 1. Vicente Sodré, 2. Brás Sodré, 3. Pêro de Ataíde on navetas and 4. Fernão Rodrigues Bardaças, 5. António Fernandes Roxo and 6. Antão Vaz (=?) on caravels. During the battle of Calicut, Correia (p.329) states Sodré led a squadron of eight ships (2 navetas and five caravels), but doesn't give names. Correia's second list (p.337) keeps the navetas as stated, but names as caravel captains 4. Ruy de Medanha (=?) 5.António Fernandes Roxo and 6. João Lopes Perestrello and possibly 7. Gomes Ferreira, a factor. Correia's third list (p.349) gives the navetas as stated, but the caravels as 4. Fernão Rodrigues Bardaças, 5. Pêro Rafael and 6. João Lopes Perestrelo. As far as ship names, Correia had provided an original list of ships at departure (p.266), where he identifies four navetas and five caravels. One naveta is known to have been lost at Sofala. Correia (p.301) explicitly states that V. Sodré took Diogo Fernandes Correia's naveta and B. Sodré took over that of 'Ruy da Cunha' (= Ruy de Castanheda). Correia states that Ataíde took over the naveta of "João Fernandes de Mello", a name that doesn't appear on any list, thus leaving us to suppose he means the last remaining naveta, that of Francisco da Cunha 'Marecos' (Ataíde passing his own large nau, the São Paulo, to somebody else). Of the five caravels, we know Campo's was still stuck in Africa, and that Fernandes, Bardaças, Rafael and Perestrello brought their own caravels to India. Supposing Fernandes to have been lost in India (as hinted elsewhere), and as Bardaças and Rafael are listed as squadron captains in other lists, that leaves us to suppose that Diogo Pires must have taken over Perestrello's caravel at some point. But this is all conjectural Cochin, Quilon November 3, 1502 His blockade of Calicut in place, Vasco da Gama arrives in Cochin (Cohim, Kochi) with the bulk of the armada. He is received by Trimumpara ruler of Cochin, not without a touch of anxiety. But cordialities soon set that to rest. The Nair hostage taken accidentally by the 2nd Armada the previous year is delivered, along with the letter of the other Nair who stayed back in Lisbon. Gama concludes negotiates a new commercial treaty with the ruler of Cochin, this time with a fixed-price schedule, like at Cannanore. Diogo Fernandes Correia, the new designated factor for Cochin, relieves Cabral's factor Gonçalo Gil Barbosa (now slated to be transferred to Cannanore) and sets about his business buying spices for the return journey. While conducting business at Cochin, Vasco da Gama receives a letter from the queen-regent of Quilon (Coulão, Kollam), on behalf of her young son, the raja Govardhana Martanda. The queen invites the Portuguese fleet to load up with spices at Quilon. Gama declines politely, noting that he cannot do anything without the permission of his Cochinese hosts. As a result, the queen-regent dispatches a messenger to the prince of Cochin. Trimumpara Raja prevaricates at first, fearing that competition from Quilon's more amply-supplied markets will hurt his own. But Cochin's slender supply is worrying the Portuguese factors. At length, an agreement is reached between all parties: Gama is to dispatch only two ships to load up with spices at Quilon, and promises not to set up a permanent factory in that city. The two ships, carrying temporary factor João de Sá Pereira, the first Portuguese to enter Quilon, will load up quickly, and return to Cochin within ten days. It is reported that while at Cochin, Gama also receives a message from Syrian Christian community of nearby Cranganore offering to place themselves under the protection of the King of Portugal. Naval Battle of Calicut December, 1502-January, 1503 While Vasco da Gama is winding up business in Cochin, and preparing to sail back to Cannanore, Trimumpara Raja of Cochin summons Gama with a piece of disturbing intelligence. The Zamorin of Calicut had hired the services of a Red Sea Arab privateer 'Cojambar' (Khoja Ambar), who had brought several large Arab ships, and slipped past the Portuguese blockade. The Arab ships have joined a fighting fleet assembling at Calicut, under the command of Calicut admiral 'Coja Casem' (Khoja Kassein), intending to ambush the Portuguese on the way to Cannanore. The Calicut fleet is estimated at 20 large ships, 40 gun-mounted sambuks (large dhows) and an innumerable number of smaller oar-powered boats, carrying several thousand armed men. Although a large Calicut fleet had failed against the much smaller 3rd Armada of João da Nova the previous year, the Zamorin might have calculated that the addition of the Arab Red Sea ships and more experienced captains might tip the balance - particularly against the heavily loaded and less-maneouverable large naus of the 4th Armada. The Raja of Cochin urges Gama to avoid the fleet and just set sail for Portugal at once. But Vasco da Gama refuses to revise his plans, claiming he needs toreturn to Cannanore to deposit a factor there and pick up a cargo of ginger he had ordered. Nonetheless, he dispatches a message to Vicente Sodré's squadron of fighting caravels, then patrolling near Cannanore, to join him in Cochin. While this discussion is going on, a Brahmin arrives in Cochin, with an offer of peace from the Zamorin, proposing to let bygones be bygones and 'restart' the Calicut-Portuguese relationship afresh. But Gama refuses and accuses the Brahmin of being a spy. Gama has him tortured, mutilated (ears cut off and dog ear's sewn on) and sent back to Calicut. Early February, 1502, After a final audience with Raja Trimumpara, taking aboard his ambassador to the Lisbon court, leaving Diogo Fernandes Correia as factor in Cochin, and taking Cabral's old factor Gonçalo Gil Barbosa, to serve as factor in Cannanore, Gama's fleet (around ten fully laden ships) finally leaves Cochin. They are soon joined by Sodré's caravel squadron, and set sail warily towards Cannanore, guns ready for the Calicut ambush. Gama and Sodré spot the Calicut fleet of Coja Casem and Arab privateer Cojambar, near the coast, out of Calicut harbor. In one of the first recorded instances of a naval line of battle, Gama's spice naus and escort caravels sail in a line end-to-end, concentrating all their immense firepower as they pass against the twenty large Arab ships of Cojambar, before they can get organized, sinking a number of them and doing immense damage to the remainder. Although the Arab squadron is out of commission too soon, Coja Casem nonetheless proceeds forward with his fleet of Malabari sambuks, hoping to use their speed to outmaneouver the guns of the heavy-laden naus and reach for the grapple. But Gama sends the escort caravels under Vicente Sodré to intercept them in their tracks, while the cargo naus hurry on toward Cannanore. Although the caravels are outnumbered, it is not much of a battle. The fight is essentially over when Pero Rafael and Gil Matoso quickly board and capture Coja Casem's flagship (oddly, found with a lot of women and children on board). The Calicut fleet breaks up and rushes back to port. The pursuing caravels capture a number of sambuks, which they proceed to tow and set on fire before Calicut. The long-prepared ambush has been foiled. Danger dispelled, the caravels proceed to Cannanore to make junction with the main fleet. The Battle of Calicut, like the previous year's naval battle of Cannanore, once again demonstrated the critical importance of the technical superiority of Portuguese ships and naval artillery. But it also demonstrated to the Portuguese that the Zamorin of Calicut was not as easy to intimidate as they had expected. Despite the terror actions, the bombardment and the naval blockade, the Zamorin steadfastly refused to capitulate to Vasco da Gama's terms. On the contrary, the hiring of an Arab privateer fleet demonstrated a certain resourcefulness and willingness to continue fighting and take the fight to the Portuguese. The hiring of Cojambar was also a foreboding. The Zamorin clearly understood he had to appeal to foreigners to help close the technical gap between Indian and Portuguese forces. Surely it would only be a matter of time before the Zamorin got his hands on Arab, Turkish and Venetian technology, and more substantial support from these great powers than just a Red Sea pirate or two? If the battle of Calicut impressed something on Vasco da Gama, it was precisely that the Portuguese in India were living on borrowed time, that it was going to take more resources than he had to bring the Zamorin to heel and secure continued Portuguese access to the spice markets. And that was the message he would bring back to Lisbon. In the meantime, his priority was to do everything he could to maintain the Portuguese toe in India - that is, to protect the Portuguese factories and Indian allies of Cochin and Cannanore, from the Zamorin's inevitable revenge the moment the 4th Armada left. Return to Cannanore Arriving in Cannanore, Gama leaves Cabral's old factor Gonçalo Gil Barbosa, and two assistants, Bastião Álvares and Diogo Nunes. With the permission of the Kolithiri Raja of Cannanore, Gama erects a small palisade around the factory. Some 200 armed men (others report merely 20) are to remain with the factory. More troubling, however, is the India patrol squadron. Back in Lisbon, Vicente Sodré had been given a commission (regimento) by king Manuel I of Portugal instructing him to lead a patrol of five or six caravels in the Gulf of Aden, and prey on the rich Arab prizes going in and out of the Red Sea. But Vasco da Gama, realizing the vulnerability of Cochin and Cannanore, invokes rank as captain-major of the armada and orders Sodré to set that mission aside, and maintain his patrol on the Indian coast, to defend the Portuguese factories and their Indian allies against any reaction by the Zamorin. Return Voyage Late February, 1503 Vasco da Gama sets sail with his ten (or twelve) laden ships back to Lisbon. some chronicles put Gama's departure from Cannanore on December 28, 1502, meaning all the events described earlier must be compacted within that shorter time period. The return journey is quick and relatively smooth, with only one stop in Mozambique Island. It is caught in a slight storm around the Cape, where Estêvão da Gama's Flor da la Mar parts company from the rest. Estêvão da Gama, making is way back to Lisbon by himself, is said to have stumbled upon the South Atlantic islands of Saint Helena (already discovered the previous year by João da Nova's Third Armada). Vasco da Gama's main fleet arrives in Lisbon in September, 1503. Gama delivers his report, noting his failure to bring the Zamorin of Calicut to terms, and urging the immediate outfitting of a strong fleet to establish strong permanent Portuguese garrisons to protect the allied cities of Cochin and Cannanore. Gama arrives too late to affect the outfitting of the 5th Armada, which had already departed in April, 1503 under the command of Afonso de Albuquerque. But his recommendation will guide the formation of the next one, the 6th Armada, set to sail in the Spring of 1504 under the command of Lopo Soares de Albergaria. Aftermath Fate of the Sodré patrol March, 1503 - As soon as Vasco da Gama's 4th Armada leaves India, as predicted, Raja Trimumpara of Cochin receives intelligence that the Zamorin of Calicut is at this very moment preparing a landward invasion of Cochin. Portuguese factor Diogo Fernandes Correia urges Vicente Sodré to keep the caravel patrol squadron close to Cochin. But Vicente Sodré, eager for the easy plunder of the Arab Red Sea shipping, dismisses the rumors, Correia reminds him of Gama's orders, to no avail - Sodré pulls out his old royal regimento and orders the coastal patrol to follow him out to the Red Sea.The 1503 letter of Diogo Fernandes Correia (p.211), the Portuguese factor of Cochin notes how Vasco da Gama promised the King of Cochin "that he would leave him Vicente Sodré to guard this port and coast; after his departure, the coast was abandoned by our armed ships, and the King of Calicut came here and did what you already know." lhe leixaria aqui vicente Sodré para elle guardar este porto e costa; depois de sua yda, qua costa ficou despejada de nossas naos darmada, elRei de calecut veyo aqui e fez o que ja sabeis" It is said that at least two of the captains of the coastal patrol refuse Sodré's orders, and willingly surrender the command of their ships rather than disobey Gama's original orders. The composition of the patrol that set out to the Red Sea varies in different accounts. One arrangementProposed in (Castanheda, p.134; Gois, p.98; Osório, p.226-27 is that it was six ships: 1. Vicente Sodré, 2. Brás Sodré, 3. Pêro de Ataíde, 4. Pêro Rafael, 5. Diogo Pires, 6. Fernão Rodrigues Bardaças. Vicente Sodré first sets out north to Gujarat, where it captures a great merchant ship off Chaul.Gois, p.98 The patrol then sails west into the Gulf of Aden, at the mouth of the Red Sea, to catch more prizes.Barros (p.88) claims that the Sodré patrol watered on Socotra, an island in the Gulf of Aden, hitherto unknown and uncharted by the Portuguese. That is possible, although it seems to have escaped notice otherwise. It is customary to credit the captain Diogo Fernandes Pereira for finding Socotra a year later, in the winter of 1503-04, and communicating its location to the Portuguese crown. About five Arab merchant ships are seized by the patrol there but, according to the account written later by Pêro de Ataíde,"Carta de Pero de Atayde a El-rei D. Manuel, Fevereiro 20, 1504", as published in Bulhão Pato, R.A. editor, 1898, Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, seguidas de documentos que as elucidam. Lisbon: Academia Real de Sciencias, vol. 2, p.262-68 the Sodré brothers set about claiming a disproportionate share of the plunder for themselves, including embezzling the royal fifth. In Ataíde's account, Brás Sodré appears as the villain of the story.According to Pêro de Ataíde's 1504 letter to King Manuel I (p.262-63), Brás Sodré took items from plunder despite "being told there and then by your clerk that such items had not yet been recorded in the your lordship's book" and, in his takings, "nobody dared grab his hand because his brother consented to everything he did". dito loguo ally polo seu escrivam e mestre que taaes couzas naom eram asemtadas em livro de vosa senhoria afora outras muitas que elle tomava quando queria porque ninguem naom ousava de lhe ir a mão porque lhe seu irmao dava consentymento a tudo fazer" Already unhappy at the decision to abandon their comrades in India, the patrol captains quarreled with the Sodré brothers and nearly mutinied. In late April, the patrol anchored in at Kuria Muria islands (off the coast of Oman). The local inhabitants warned them that a seasonal tempest was forming and that they had better move their ships to a safer shelter on the southern side of the island. Four patrol captains moved their ships accordingly, but Vicente Sodré and Brás Sodré refused (the ongoing quarrel over the spoils may have been a factor in this decision.) As the locals predicted, the tempest came, destroyed and sunk the ships of Vicente Sodré and Brás Sodré. Vicente went down with his ship, Brás survived to made it ashore, although he would die soon after in mysterious circumstances Ataíde (p.263) says that upon reaching the beach, Brás Sodré laid the blame on his Muslim pilots and executed them on the spot. Ataíde evades saying exactly what happened to Brás Sodré after that, only that "many things transpired" ("se pasaram muitas couzas"). In the aftermath, the four remaining ships of the coastal patrol, who elected of Pêro de Ataíde as their new commander, set back for India. However, contrary winds make it a difficult journey, and they inch back only painfully and slowly. The battered patrol hobbles into Angediva island sometime in the summer of 1503, where they are forced to stop to repair their crippled ships. Four days after arriving in Angediva, a fifth ship, the caravel of António do Campo (who having missed the previous year's monsoon, was forced to stay in East Africa throughout all this) arrives in Anjediva and joins the patrol.Goia, p.99 They are still repairing at Angediva when the ships of Francisco de Albuquerque and Nicolau Coelho, the vanguard of the 5th Armada, arrives in India in August, 1503. First Siege of Cochin April 1503 – Not long after the Sodré patrol departed for the Red Sea, the Zamorin of Calicut arrived with his 50,000-strong army at Repelim (Edapalli), on the boundaries of the Cochinese state. He demanded that the Raja Trimumpara of Cochin hand his Portuguese guests over to him. But Trimumpara refused and his son Narayan repels two Calicut assaults. By bribery and deceit, the Zamorin manages to detach a lot of Cochin's army, overwhelms the defenses and kills prince Narayan at a battle near the Edapalli ford. The Trimumpara Raja and his Portuguese guests (factor Diogo Fernandes Correia and his assistants), accompanied by a small loyal Nair guard, abandon Cochin city and flee across the harbor to Vypin, a barrier island of the Vembanad lagoon. Vypin's natural defenses and the deteriorating weather prevent the Zamorin from launching assault boats and seizing the island. Frustrated, the Zamorin burns down the city of Cochin. The siege will drag on for several months, until Francisco de Albuquerque, leading the remnant of the Sodré patrol, hurrying down from Angediva, arrived in Cochin in August–September, and forced the Calicut forces to withdraw. Sometime during the course of this siege, the two Italian military engineers (and probable Venetian agents) that had come as passengers on Gama's ships - known only as João Maria (Gianmaria) and Pêro António (Pierantonio) - escaped Cochin and made their way to the Zamorin' camp, offering their services to the army of Calicut.Gois (p. 97) Expert gun-founders, the Italians will teach Calicut to found large European guns and help close the technological gap between Indian and Portuguese artillery. The Zamorin of Calicut, before burning down Cochin, removed an ancient sacred stone, upon which the ancient Kings of Malabar (see Chera Dynasty) were traditionally ceremonially esconsed as lords of the sea and overlords of all the Malabari states. The sacred stone had originally been housed at the ancient Malabari capital of Cranganore, but had since been moved to Cochin. The Zamorin now moved it once more, to Edapalli.Whiteway (1899: p. 95, 251) See also * Portuguese India Armadas Notes Sources Primary accounts: * Flemish sailor Calcoen (Flemish account), first pub. 1504, Antwerp [English trans. in J.P. Berjeau, 1874, Calcoen, a Dutch narrative of the second voyage of Vasco da Gama to Calicut, printed at Antwerp circa 1504. London. online translation in [[Augusto Carlos Teixeira de Aragão|A.C. Teixeira de Aragão], 1887, Vasco da Gama e a Vidigueira: um estudo historico. Lisbon: Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa. online[French trans. in J. Denucé, 1931, Calcoen, récit flamand du second voyage de Vasco de Gama vers l'Inde, en 1502-1503] * German sailor account first pub. 1986 in M. Krasa, J. Polisensky and P. Ratkos, ed., European Expansion 1494-1519: the voyages of discovery in the Bratislava manuscript Lyc. 515/8. Prague: Charles University. * Portuguese sailor account first pub. 1939 in Christine von Rohr, ed., Neue Quellen zur zweiten Indienfahrt Vasco da Gamas, Leipzig: Koehler. [Reprinted with corrections by L. Freire Costa, 1985, "Relação anónima da segunda viagem de Vasco da Gama à índia" in Cidadania e História. Em homenagem a Jaime Cortesão. Lisbon: Sá da Costa.] * Matteo da Bergamo Two Italian letters from Mozambique written Apr. 1503, pub. in 1902, Prospero Peragallo, ed., "Viaggio di Matteo da Bergamo in India sulla flotta di Vasco da Gama (1502-1503)", Bollettino della Società geografica italiana, p. 92-129 online * Thomé Lopes original Portuguese version lost; Italian translation first pub. 1550 as "Navigatione verso l'Indie orientali scritta per Thomé Lopez, scrivano de una nave Portoghesa", in Giovanni Battista Ramusio, ed., Primo volume delle navigationi et viaggi nel qua si contine la descrittione dell'Africa, et del paese del Prete Ianni, on varii viaggi, dal mar Rosso a Calicut,& infin all'isole Molucche, dove nascono le Spetierie et la navigatione attorno il mondo., Venice.online [Translated 1812 into Portuguese as "Navegação as Indias Orientaes, escrita em Portuguez por Thomé Lopes, traduzida da lingua Portugueza para a Italiana, e novamente do Italiano para o Portuguez", by Academia Real das Sciencias in Collecção de noticias para a historia e geografia das nações ultramarinas: que vivem nos dominios portuguezes, ou lhes são visinhas, Vol. 2, Pt. 5 * Pêro de Ataíde "Carta de Pero de Atayde a El-rei D. Manuel, Fevereiro 20, 1504", as published in Bulhão Pato, R.A. editor, 1898, Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, seguidas de documentos que as elucidam. Lisbon: Academia Real de Sciencias, vol. 2 p.262-268. * Diogo Fernandes Correia "Carta de Diogo Fernandes Corrêa a Afonso de Albuquerque, Dezembro 25, 1503", as published in Bulhão Pato, R.A. editor, 1898, Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, seguidas de documentos que as elucidam. Lisbon: Academia Real de Sciencias, vol. 2 p.211-213. * Francesco Corbinelli "Lettera di Francesco Corbinelli da Lisbona, Aug 22, 1503" [French trans. in P. Teyssier & P. Valentin translators, J. Aubin, ed.,Voyages de Vasco de Gama: relations des expéditions de 1497-1499 & 1502-1503. Paris: Chandeigne. p. 353-55 online * Giovanni Francesco Affaitati "Lettere di Zuan Francesco di l'Afaitada, data a Lisbona a di 19 avosto, 1503", repr. 1881 in Frederico Stefani, ed., I diarii di Marino Sanuto, Venice, vol.5, p.130f. Chronicles: * João de Barros (1552–59) Décadas da Ásia: Dos feitos, que os Portuguezes fizeram no descubrimento, e conquista, dos mares, e terras do Oriente.. Dec. I, Lib 6. * Luís Vaz de Camões, (1572) Os Lusíadas. [trans. by W.J. Mickle, 1776, as The Lusiad, or the discovery of India, an epic poem] *Fernão Lopes de Castanheda (1551–1560) História do descobrimento & conquista da Índia pelos portugueses edition Lib 1, Ch. 44 * Gaspar Correia (c. 1550s) Lendas da Índia, first pub. 1858-64, Lisbon: Academia Real de Sciencias Vol. 1; [partially trans. H.E. Stanley, 1869, as The Three Voyages of Vasco de Gama, and his viceroyalty London: Hakluyt Society.] * Manuel de Faria e Sousa (1666) Asia Portuguesa, Vol. 1. * *Damião de Goes (1566–67) Chrónica do Felicíssimo Rei D. Manuel, da Gloriosa Memoria (As reprinted in 1749, Lisbon: M. Manescal da Costa) online *Jerónimo Osório (1586) De rebus Emmanuelis [trans. Port., 1804, Da Vida e Feitos d'El Rei D. Manuel, Lisbon: Impressão Regia.] [trans. Eng. 1752 by J. Gibbs as The History of the Portuguese during the Reign of Emmanuel London: Millar] * Relação das Náos e Armadas da India com os Sucessos dellas que se puderam Saber, para Noticia e Instrucção dos Curiozos, e Amantes da Historia da India (Codex Add. 20902 of the British Library), António de Ataíde, orig. editor. Transcribed & reprinted in 1985, by M.H. Maldonado, Biblioteca Geral da Universidade de Coimbra. online Secondary: * Aubin, J. (1995) "Preface", in Voyages de Vasco de Gama: relations des expéditions de 1497-1499 & 1502-1503. Paris: Chandeigne. * Brito Rebelo, J.I. (1898) "Navegadores e exploradores portuguezes até o XVI século (Documentos para a sua historia: Vasco da Gama, sua família, suas viagens, seus companheiros", Revista de Educação e Ensino, v. 13 * Bouchon, G. (1975) Mamale de Cananor: Un adversaire de l'Inde portugaise, 1507–1528, Paris: Droz. * Dames, M.L. (1918) "Introduction" in An Account Of The Countries Bordering On The Indian Ocean And Their Inhabitants, Vol. 1 (Engl. transl. of Livro de Duarte de Barbosa), 2005 reprint, New Delhi: Asian Education Services. * Danvers, F.C. (1894) The Portuguese in India, being a history of the rise and decline of their eastern empire. 2 vols, London: Allen. * Diffie, Bailey W., and George D. Winius (1977) Foundations of the Portuguese empire, 1415-1580 Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press * Logan, W. (1887) Malabar Manual, 2004 reprint, New Delhi: Asian Education Services. * Madan, K.D. (1998) Life and travels of Vasco Da Gama. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services. * Quintella, Ignaco da Costa (1839–40) Annaes da Marinha Portugueza, 2 vols, Lisbon: Academia Real das Sciencias. * Visconde de Sanches da Baena (1897) O Descobridor do Brazil, Pedro Alvares Cabral: memoria apresentada á Academia real das sciencias de Lisboa. Lisbon online * Saraiva, Cardinal Francisco de S.L. (1849) Os Portuguezes em Africa, Asia, America, e Occeania, Lisbon: Borges. * Strong, S. Arthur (1895) "The History of Kilwa, edited from an Arabic MS", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol., p. 385-431. online * Subrahmanyam, S. (1997) The Career and Legend of Vasco da Gama. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. * Theal, G.M. (1896) The Portuguese in South Africa: with a description of the native races between the River Zambesi and the Cape of Good Hope during the sixteenth century. London Unwin. * Whiteway, R. S. (1899) The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 1497-1550. Westminster: Constable. Category:Maritime history of Portugal Category:Portuguese India Armadas Category:Portuguese in Kerala Category:1502